The emergence of the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza virus has reminded us of the potential for cross-species transmission of influenza viruses. As veterinarians, we believe that protecting human health is of primary importance, and all reasonable measures should be taken to avoid any unnecessary risk to human health. The “One Health Initiative” of the American Veterinary Medical Association and the American Medical Association recognizes the impact that animals have on human health and vice versa.1 An essential component of protecting human health is providing a safe, high quality, and affordable food supply. Influenza recommendations for pork production staff, veterinarians, and harvest plant workers To protect both human health and the food supply, the American Association of Swine Veterinarians (AASV) strongly advises that all personnel working in the pork production industry be vaccinated against seasonal influenza annually and against any novel human influenza A viruses as they emerge.2-5 Vaccination enhances protection for personnel while minimizing the likelihood of viral transmission from personnel to pigs. Therefore the AASV recommends that:Swine owners continue to encourage, facilitate, and financially support employee vaccination against seasonal influenza viruses.All personnel associated with pork production and harvest in North America be given high priority for vaccination against any novel influenza virus that emerges in the human population.The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, state departments of health, and local health departments work in close cooperation with, solicit input from, and collaborate in the decision-making process with USDA-APHIS, state animal health officials, and local veterinarians through the establishment of working groups and defined communication channels to facilitate the implementation of vaccination plans across North America.All personnel associated with pork production and harvest intensify basic hygiene and biosecurity practices.
Monthly Archives: July 2009
Register Your Team for the AASV Foundation Golf Outing!
Time is drawing short to register for the AASV Foundation’s annual Midwest Golf Outing, to be held Wednesday, August 19 at Fox Ridge Golf Club in Dike, Iowa. Individual and team registrations are due August 5.
People on the Move: Dr. Meghann Pierdon
Dr. Meghann Pierdon has accepted a position as Swine Technical Consultant for Elanco Animal Health. She will be providing technical support for Elanco swine products in the Eastern United States, in addition to performing post-approval research studies for the company. Dr. Pierdon had most recently been engaged in private practice with her husband in Elizabethtown, Pa., and prior to that, was employed by Country View Family Farms, LLC. Updated contact information for Dr. Pierdon is available at http://www.aasv.org/members/only/directory.php. Are you on the move? If so, let us know at aasv@aasv.org.
A/H1N1 Pandemic Influenza Virus ‘Patient Zero’ Found in Mexico [Edited]
The world’s 1st known A/H1N1 Pandemic Influenza Virus victim was a 6-month-old baby girl in northern Mexico who had no known contact with pig farms, the head of a laboratory studying the virus said on Thursday [23 Jul 2009].
No Antibiotics Amendment, Groups Urge Speaker
A group of agricultural organizations, including the National Pork Producers Council, is urging the Speaker of the House not to allow a bill to ban certain animal health products to be tacked on to any pending legislation.
National Pork Producers Council Announces Upcoming Staffing Changes
The following statement is attributed to Neil Dierks, CEO of NPPC: “It is with regret I have accepted the resignation of Kirk Ferrell, NPPC Vice President of Public Policy, who is leaving to devote more time to his family. I greatly respect and admire Kirk’s decision. He will continue in his present position until late September to assist with the transition to a new vice president and to help with a number of critical issues NPPC currently is facing.”
Canada Alters Management Plan for Pandemic H1N1 in Swine Herds
The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), in collaboration with stakeholders, trading partners, and the public and animal health communities, has refined its approach to managing cases of the pandemic H1N1 2009 virus in swine.
Discovery of Swine as a Host for the Reston Ebolavirus
Since the discovery of the Marburg and Ebola species of filovirus, seemingly random, sporadic fatal outbreaks of disease in humans and nonhuman primates have given impetus to identification of host tropisms and potential reservoirs. Domestic swine in the Philippines, experiencing unusually severe outbreaks of porcine reproductive and respiratory disease syndrome, have now been discovered to host Reston ebolavirus (REBOV). Although REBOV is the only member of Filoviridae that has not been associated with disease in humans, its emergence in the human food chain is of concern. REBOV isolates were found to be more divergent from each other than from the original virus isolated in 1989, indicating polyphyletic origins and that REBOV has been circulating since, and possibly before, the initial discovery of REBOV in monkeys.
FDA Calls for Ban on Antibiotics for Growth Promotion
Dr. Joshua Sharfstein of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in testimony before the House Rules Committee announced that FDA supports “ending the use of antibiotics for growth and feed efficiency in the United States.” Sharfstein also stated that FDA believes all medications used in animal agriculture should be “under the supervision of a veterinarian.” This is a major change in policy by the FDA.
Pathogen Exposure in Feral Swine Populations Geographically Associated with High Densities of Transitional Swine Premises and Commercial Swine Production
Surveys for evidence of exposure to pseudorabies virus (PRV), Brucella suis, swine influenza virus (SIV; human-like H1N1, reassortant type H1N1, H1N2-like H1N1 and H3N2), porcine circovirus 2 (PCV 2), and porcine respiratory and reproductive syndrome virus (PRRSV) in feral swine (Sus scrofa) were conducted in areas where feral swine were geographically associated with high densities of transitional swine premises in South Carolina and high densities of commercial swine production in North Carolina. In South Carolina, 10/50 (20.0%), 7/50 (14.0%), and 29/49 (59.2%) feral swine tested antibody positive for PRV, B. suis, and PCV-2, respectively. Antibodies to PRRSV (0/49) and SIV (0/49) were not detected. In North Carolina, antibodies to PRV and B. suis were not detected in serum samples from 120 feral swine; however, antibodies to PRRSV (1/120 [0.8%]), PCV-2 (86/120 [71.7%]; these included 80 positives plus six suspects), and SIV (108/119 [90.7%]) were present. The presence of PRV and B. suis in South Carolina may have been due to the introduction of infected feral swine into the area or to a previous association of feral swine with infected transitional swine. Their absence in the North Carolina populations may have been due to the absence of these disease agents in the feral swine originally introduced into the area and the lack of a potential for contact with infected commercial swine. Feral swine associated with commercial swine in North Carolina may have been exposed to SIV subtypes circulating in commercial swine via airborne spread of SIV from commercial swine facilities. Feral swine seropositive for PCV-2 were prevalent in both states, which may indicate efficient transmission from commercial swine and transitional swine, or that PCV-2 is widespread in feral swine. The low prevalence of animals with antibodies against PRRSV may indicate a less-than-efficient means of transmission from commercial to feral swine. Additional epidemiologic studies are needed to understand the risks and mechanisms of transmission of disease agents among commercial, transitional, and feral swine, and the role of feral swine as reservoirs of these disease agents.